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INTRODUCTION
The reliability of criminal identifications' is highly contested in
both legal and psychological circles. Commentators and psychologists
label eyewitness evidence "inherently suspect" and argue that sugges-
tive procedures often increase the risk not only of out-of-court mis-
identification,2 but also of in-court misidentification. 3 Indeed, even
the Supreme Court recognizes that " [t] he vagaries of eyewitness iden-
tification are well-known" and that "the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification. '4 These concerns are partic-
ularly troublesome because identifications are among the most com-
I Pretrial identification procedures come in three basic forms: the lineup, the
showup, and the photographic identification. In a lineup, an eyewitness looks at several
individuals at the same time in an effort to identify one of the individuals as the perpetra-
tor. See P. WALL, IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 40 (1965). The police include individu-
als in the lineup other than the suspect to lend credence to the fact that the witness is
identifying the actual perpetrator. See Granville Williams & H.A. Hammelmann, Identifica-
tion Parades (pt. 1), 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 479, 480. Unlike a lineup, a showup involves a one-
on-one confrontation. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 195 (1972). Two basic types of
photographic identification procedures exist. The first, a photographic array, consists of a
witness being shown a number of photographs simultaneously, one of which is of the sus-
pect. This method is similar to a lineup. See N. Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion:
Evolving Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOK. L. REV.
261, 264 (1971). The second involves the witness being shown only the defendant's photo-
graph. This method is similar to a showup. See id. Finally, counsel almost always asks the
eyewitness to identify the perpetrator in the jury's presence at trial.
2 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 701(a), at 374-75 (3d ed.
2000).
3 With regard to the increased risk of in-court misidentification, once an original
identification is made, a witness often substitutes in his memory an image from the lineup
for the prior image of the criminal at the time of the offense. See Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); infra text accompanying notes 31-33. Similarly, the
Court recognized in United States v. Wade that once a witness has picked out the accused at
a lineup, he is "'not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of
identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be deter-
mined there and then, before the trial."' United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)
(quoting Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 1, at 482).
4 Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. Similarly, Justice Felix Frankfurter once commented that
"[t]he identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testi-
mony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and
American trials." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETT 30 (Universal Li-
brary ed., Grosset & Dunlap 1962) (1927).
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mon forms of evidence presented at trials5 and are frequently an
essential piece of evidence leading to a defendant's conviction. 6
Although the unreliability of eyewitness identifications is widely
documented,7 the Supreme Court has spent relatively little time devis-
ing safeguards in this important area.8 The Court has, however, rec-
ognized some constitutional guarantees under the Sixth Amendment9
and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 10 With regard to due process, the Court has acknowledged
that defendants possess a right to have unreliable identification testi-
mony excluded if it is derived from unnecessarily suggestive identifica-
5 See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWIT-
NESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 6 (1995); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 701 (a), at 374
("Eyewitness identification . . . is frequently an essential piece of evidence . . . as more
scientific forms of identification evidence, such as fingerprint and handwriting analyses,
are not always available.").
6 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONER-
ATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFrER TRIAL 13-15 (1996) (examining twenty-eight cases of wrongful conviction uncovered
by DNA comparison, of which twenty-three were based on eyewitness identification); LAW-
RENCE TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 1 (1982) (declaring that "[t]he tragic irony of
eyewitness testimony is that it is at the same time the most trusted of evidence and too
often the least reliable"); cf Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and
Proof of Guilt, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 396 (1987) (noting that "while convictions based on
eyewitness errors may be more frequent than are other types of erroneous convictions, in
absolute terms they are rare"); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness,
10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 242-43 (1986) (citing a 1983 Ohio State University doctoral
dissertation estimating that over half of all wrongful convictions per year are due to false
identification).
7 While this unreliability is well known in psychological circles and certain legal cir-
cles, see infra Part I, jurors seldom enter a courtroom with the knowledge that eyewitness
identifications are unreliable, see infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the like-
lihood that jurors' common-sense knowledge includes information about the unreliability
of eyewitness testimony and citing a study regarding juror common-sense knowledge).
8 Wayne LaFave notes that prior to the 1967 case, United States v. Wade, virtually no
constitutional framework existed to deal with eyewitness identifications. See LAFAVE, supra
note 2, § 701 (a), at 376. Since Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard relatively few cases
directly on this subject. Oddly, the Supreme Court has adopted more rigorous rules,
which have resulted in the exclusion of more reliable evidence, in several other areas of
law. Most notable are the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in search-and-seizure cases
and the requirement that suspects be given Miranda rights prior to police interrogation.
9 The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. Relevant cases recognizing Sixth Amendment constitutional guarantees and their lim-
its include United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972),
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
10 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal gov-
ernment, provides: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which applies to state governments, states: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. Relevant cases recognizing due process guarantees include Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 114 (1977), Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1972), Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
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tion procedures. When the issue is the admissibility of an in-court
identification, the constitutional question is phrased in terms of
whether an earlier "unnecessarily suggestive" procedure created "a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."'I When
the issue is the admissibility of an out-of-court identification, the stan-
dard remains the same but "with the deletion of 'irreparable.' "12 In
both situations, a court must first determine whether the pretrial iden-
tification procedure unnecessarily suggested that the defendant was
the perpetrator.' 3 If the procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive,
there exists no due process obstacle to admitting the identification
testimony; the reliability of the identification in such a case is a matter
for the jury.14 If, on the other hand, a court finds that the procedure
was unnecessarily suggestive, it must then determine whether the
identification testimony would nonetheless be independently reliable;
if so, its admission would not violate due process.
This Note examines a circuit split, recently reemphasized by the
Second Circuit's decision in Raheem v. Kelly, 15 concerning the proper
role of corroborative evidence in due process analysis of the admissi-
bility of eyewitness identification testimony. The Second, Third, and
Fifth Circuits agree that corroborative evidence of a criminal defen-
dant's general guilt"-as opposed to corroborative evidence support-
ing the accuracy of the identification itself' 7-may not be considered
'1 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 381, 384.
12 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198. In both situations, courts consider the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" to determine whether due process was violated. See Brathwaie, 432 U.S. at
106; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 196-97; Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
13 An example of an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure is a lineup in
which only the suspect is wearing distinctive clothing or otherwise matches important ele-
ments of the description provided by the victim. For instance, where eyeglasses were "the
outstanding feature of the assailant's appearance to the victim and an integral part of the
description provided the police," a lineup in which only the defendant wore eyeglasses was
found unnecessarily suggestive. See Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1975).
Unnecessary suggestiveness requires more than inherent suggestiveness, but courts evalu-
ate whether a given procedure is unnecessarily suggestive on a case-by-case basis and have
not always been consistent in their application. See infra note 50. For an example of a
particularly egregious identification procedure, see infra note 26.
14 See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442 n.2 (1969) (noting that "[t]he reliability
of properly admitted eyewitness identification, like the credibility of the other parts of the
prosecution's case is a matter for the jury," but also that "it is the teaching of Wade, Gilbert,
and Stovall that in some cases the procedures leading to an eyewitness identification may
be so defective as to make the identification constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of
law." (citation omitted)).
15 257 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom, Donnelly v. Raheem, 534 U.S. 1118
(2002).
16 An example of corroborative evidence of general guilt is a defendant's confession.
17 An example of corroborative evidence supporting the accuracy of the identification
itself is testimony from an eyewitness who saw the defendant from a short distance, in good
light, for a substantial period of time.
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in determining whether identification evidence is reliable.' 8 These
circuits confine their consideration of corroborative evidence of gen-
eral guilt to assessing, on appeal, whether the error in admitting iden-
tification testimony resulting from unnecessarily suggestive
procedures was harmless.1 9 The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits, on the other hand, have indicated that their assessment of an
identification's reliability-as distinct from any harmless-error analy-
sis-may include consideration of corroborative evidence of a defen-
dant's general guilt.20
Raheem's outcome illustrates the importance of this circuit split.
When the lower courts considered general evidence of guilt in deter-
mining the reliability of identification testimony stemming from an
unnecessarily suggestive procedure, Raheem was found guilty.2' On
appeal, however, the Second Circuit considered only corroborative ev-
idence that was specifically relevant to the accuracy of the identifica-
tion itself when determining its admissibility.22 Under this standard,
the court held that the lineup should not have been admitted. 23 As
previously mentioned, identifications are often very powerful evi-
dence, 24 and without the identification, Raheem's conviction was
overturned. 2 5
18 See, e.g., Raheem, 257 F.3d at 140-41; United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th
Cir. 1997) (stating that the bulk of evidence presented at trial could not be used in analyz-
ing whether an identification was reliable because "admissibility rests on the reliability of
the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a
well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of
other available evidence"); United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1995)
(stating that resorting to unrelated corroborative evidence "is contrary to the Supreme
Court's guidance in Brathwaite that other evidence indicating a defendant's guilt 'plays no
part in our analysis' of reliability").
19 See Rogers, 126 F.3d at 659-60; Emanuele, 51 F.3d at 1128.
20 It should be noted that the court in Raheem cites only Fourth and Seventh Circuit
cases disagreeing with its approach. Raheem, 257 F.3d at 140. However, the First and
Eighth Circuits also disagree with the Second Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson,
84 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that courts "may also consider other evidence of
the defendant's guilt when assessing the reliability of the in-court identification"); United
States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding a witness's identification reliable
because other evidence showed at least two other witnesses also identified the defendant);
Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 270 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding an eyewitness identification
reliable despite weaknesses of the identification testimony because defendant admitted
buying the weapon and car used in the robbery and murder, stealing a license plate for
another car used in the crime, and taking proceeds from the robbery); United States ex rel.
Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1156-57, 1161 (7th Cir. 1987) (considering the fact that
defendant drove the getaway car described by witnesses in determining whether identifica-
tions of defendant were reliable).
21 See Raheem, 257 F.3d. at 131.
22 See id. at 141-42.
23 See id. at 142-43.
24 See LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 2, at 374.
25 See Raheem, 257 F.3d at 143. In other words, the Second Circuit determined that
the trial court's admission of the identification was not harmless error.
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This Note argues that Raheem v. Kelly correctly recognizes that cor-
roborative evidence of general guilt should be considered only in any
post-trial harmless error analysis. Part I of this Note provides psycho-
logical background, which demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification testimony and identification procedures.
This unreliability underscores the importance of considering only cor-
roborative evidence that is directly related to whether the witness in-
dependently identified the defendant when determining whether
admitting identification testimony violates a defendant's right to due
process. Part II sets forth the development of the right to counsel and
due process jurisprudence as applied to eyewitness identifications.
This background reveals how ineffective the right to counsel has
proven and lays the foundation for a principled analysis of the proper
use of general corroborative evidence according to the three primary
concerns implicated when applying the Due Process Clause to identifi-
cation testimony-reliability of the identification, the administration
of justice, and deterrence of future corruptive identification proce-
dures. Part III summarizes Raheem v. Kelly, which case best illustrates
the different approaches courts take with regard to corroborative evi-
dence of general guilt. Finally, Part IV analyzes the circuit split, con-
cluding that the Raheem approach is the more proper analysis. First,
the Raheem approach is more in accordance with prior caselaw. Sec-
ond, applying concerns of reliability of the identification, the adminis-
tration of justice, and deterrence, in conjunction with three larger
constitutional principles-the concerns of appropriateness of process,
accuracy of outcomes, and global appropriateness of process-de-
mands this conclusion.
I
EYEWITNESS RELIABILITY
Misidentifications occur for a variety of reasons. Some misiden-
tifications result from 'the intentional use of suggestive techniques by
police officers. 26 Many, however, result from conditions beyond po-
lice control, such as the "inherent unreliability of human perception
and memory and.., human susceptibility to unintentional, and often
26 See, e.g., LUDOVIC KENNEDY, THE AIRMAN AND THE CARPENTER: THE LINDBERGH KID-
NAPPING AND THE FRAMING OF RICHARD HAUPTMANN 176-77 (1985). This book describes a
highly suggestive lineup involving the man suspected of kidnapping and murdering the
Lindbergh baby. A policeman informed an eyewitness to certain critical events prior to the
lineup and said to him, "we've got the right man," and "don't say anything until I ask you if
he is the man." Id. at 176. Then the defendant, who was a short man, was placed between
two "beefy, 6-foot New York policemen" for identification. Id. at 177. Unsurprisingly, the
witness identified the defendant as the perpetrator. See id. The defendant was later exe-
cuted, and many continue to believe he was innocent. See id. at 1-2.
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quite subtle, suggestive influences."27 People can simultaneously per-
ceive only a limited number of stimuli from their environment. 28 As a
result, eyewitnesses often have difficulty simultaneously perceiving
and remembering the facial features, height, weight, age, and other
characteristics of a perpetrator.29 Additionally, witnesses tend to see
what they expect or want to see and to fill in gaps in their memory by
stereotyping-a natural phenomenon that helps individuals distill
stimuli and thus understand their complex environment.30
The human mind integrates information from separate occur-
rences, "incorporating the memory of a person on one occasion into
the memory of another occasion altogether, superimposing one upon
the other, perhaps due to the similarity of occasions." 31 For example,
a witness often identifies a suspect in a lineup because he looks famil-
iar.32 The witness then "subconsciously identifies the familiarity with
the [criminal] incident, and the two become integrated into one: the
familiar face was 'seen' during the perpetration of the crime," even
though in truth the witness never actually saw the suspect at the time
of the crime.33 Beyond these difficulties, memory decays over time,
and witnesses continuously fill in new gaps with new information.34
Most psychologists agree that this process of perception and
memory can be divided into three sequential stages: acquisition, re-
tention, and retrieval. 35 In the first stage, a witness perceives an event
and enters this information into his memory system. 36 During the sec-
ond stage, time passes before a witness attempts to remember the
event.3 7 In the final stage, a witness tries to recall the information. 38
27 Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on
the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 970 (1977). A classic exam-
ple of mistaken perception and memory occurred during the Senate Watergate hearings in
1973, when John Dean testified about a meeting with Herbert Kalmbach. See ELIZABETH F.
Lovrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 10 (Lexis Law
Publ'g 1997) (1987). Dean repeatedly claimed that he had met Kalmbach in the
Mayflower Hotel's coffee shop in Washington D.C., and that they had both gone directly to
Kalmbach's room. Id. Even after one of Dean's questioners revealed that the Mayflower
Hotel did not show that Kalmbach was registered at the time in question, Dean reaffirmed
his testimony and explained that perhaps Kalmbach had used a fake name. See id. Eventu-
ally, the mistake was discovered and the story was cleared up: the Statler Hilton Hotel in
Washington had a coffee shop called the Mayflower Doughnut Coffee Shop, and
Kalmbach had been registered at that hotel during the time in question.
28 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 23, 35-37.
29 See ELIZABETH Lovrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 36-37 (1979).
30 See id. at 36-37.
31 Id. at 39.
32 Id. at 39.
33 Id.
34 Woocher, supra note 27, at 982-83.
35 See, e.g., Lovrus & DOYLE, supra note 27, at 11.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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Several factors at each stage affect the accuracy of the eyewitness ac-
county"" According to Elizabeth Loftus and James Doyle, these stages
and factors may be summarized in chart form as follows:
I. Acquisition Stage
A. Event Factors
1. Lighting conditions
2. Duration of event
3. Violence
B. Witness Factors
1. Stress or fear
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Expectations
I. Retention Stage
A. Length of retention interval
B. Post-event information
1II. Retrieval Stage
A. Method of questioning
B. Confidence level40
As indicated by this chart, in addition to the numerous psycholog-
ical phenomena associated with acquiring and retaining information,
the particular identification procedures or "methods of questioning"
also may contribute to the unreliability of eyewitness identifications,
even if they are not the product of purposeful police misconduct.4 1
One problem is that the police officer conducting a lineup often has a
suspect in mind. Scientists accept that the only way to keep a police
officer, like any interviewer, from affecting the outcome of a lineup is
to keep officers "blind"-that is, unaware of the desired outcome. 42
When police officers know the desired outcome, they tend "to obtain
results they expect, not simply because they have correctly anticipated
the response but rather because they have helped to shape the re-
sponse through their expectations. '14 3 The cues suggesting an of-
ficer's expectations, often subtle and unintentional, may include
visual signals such as raised eyebrows and change of posture or vocal
symbols such as voice tone. 44
Another flaw with identification procedures is that witnesses com-
monly feel that they must pick the person in a lineup who looks most
149 Id.
40 See id.
41 See supra note 26 (discussing an example of purposeful police misconduct).
42 See Bill Nettles et al., Eyewitness Identfication: 'I Noticed You Paused on Number Three,
CHAMPION, Nov. 1996, at 10, 11-12.
4"3 Id. at 11.
44 See ROBERT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 286
(1966); WILLEM A. WAGENAAR, IDENTIFYING IVAN: A CASE STUDY IN LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 55-57
(1988).
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like the perpetrator and that no "none-of-the-above" answer exists.45
One study found that when witnesses were warned that the perpetra-
tor might not be in the lineup, misidentifications occurred in thirty-
three percent of the cases; without this warning, however, the error
rate was seventy-eight percent. 4 6
Such problems inherent 47 in identifications are regularly consid-
ered by courts to be issues for the jury to sort out in determining the
weight to give identification testimony.48 As a result, some courts have
recently been more willing to allow expert witnesses to testify as to the
inherent unreliability of identifications and to the deficiencies in
45 See Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions
and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 483 (1981). To address this
problem, some commentators have suggested using blank lineups, which require the wit-
ness to view two lineups. See Gerald D. Lefcourt, The Blank Line-up: An Aid to the Defense, 14
CRiM. L. BULL. 428, 430 (1978). Authorities should tell the witness that the suspect may
not be present in either lineup. Id. Although the suspect is not present in the first lineup,
the suspect is present in the second lineup. Id. If the witness is someone who has a ten-
dency to pick the person who most resembles the perpetrator, this tendency would be
brought out during the first lineup in which the suspect is not present. Id. However, if the
witness is able to identify the actual suspect in the second lineup, that identification will
properly carry greater weight. Id.
46 See Malpass & Devine, supra note 45, at 485.
47 Unlike the psychological phenomena that make accurate identification difficult,
the two procedural flaws just discussed are not truly inherent. This Note considers them as
such, however, in the sense that they are pervasive and courts have not found them consti-
tutionally offensive.
48 If a trial judge denies a motion to suppress an identification, the defense attorney
typically will try to convince the jury that the eyewitness identification is inaccurate by em-
phasizing the suggestive aspects of the identification through examining experts and cross-
examining eyewitnesses. Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Eval-
uating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 338, 346 (1997). Believing that
jurors can properly weigh such evidence is based upon assumptions regarding attorneys',
judges', and jurors' common-sense knowledge about factors that influence identifications.
Id. at 340-44. "[R]esearch examining the role of commonsense knowledge in juror evalua-
tions of eyewitness evidence suggests that jurors have commonsense knowledge regarding
some factors that influence eyewitness identification accuracy but appear to lack scientific
knowledge regarding other factors." Id. at 357. In one study, over 500 subjects answered
questions designed to test their knowledge of factors that influence eyewitness identifica-
tions. The results suggest that much of what is known about eyewitness identification is not
"within the jury's common knowledge." Roger B. Handbery, Expert Testimony of Eyewitness
Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1035 (1995).
Unfortunately, studies have found that although expert psychological testimony im-
proves juror commonsense knowledge about some factors affecting eyewitness identifica-
tion memory, such as violence, eyewitness confidence, and other factors that influence
witnessing conditions, it does not "appear to enhance juror commonsense knowledge of
factors influencing lineup suggestiveness." Devenport et al., supra, at 357. Several Su-
preme Court Justices have echoed this sentiment. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S.
341, 352 (1981) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("'[T]here is almost nothing more convincing than
a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says "That's
the one!""' (quoting LoFrus, supra note 29, at 19)); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120
(1977) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stating that 'juries unfortunately are often unduly recep-
tive to [identification] evidence").
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human perception and memory.49 Only if the court finds that the
procedures were "unnecessarily suggestive '50 must it and not the jury
determine whether testimony deriving from the procedure is none-
theless independently reliable. 51 If such testimony lacks reliability, yet
is presented to a jury, the defendant's due process rights will be vio-
lated.52 In critically examining due process analysis of identification
testimony this Note works within the doctrinal construct that the Su-
preme Court has developed. However, one should recognize that, ac-
cording to psychological evidence discussed in this Part, it may be
quite difficult to accurately ascertain the reliability of potentially
tainted eyewitness testimony. This fact underscores the importance
that courts consider only evidence that directly sheds light on reliabil-
ity once an identification procedure is deemed unnecessarily
suggestive.
49 This trend began in the 1980s. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308,
1313 (5th Cir. 1986) (declaring that "in a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewit-
ness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification is admis-
sible and properly may be encouraged"); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232
(3d Cir. 1985) (pronouncing that "expert testimony on eyewitness perception and memory
[should] be admitted at least in some circumstances"); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d
1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[t]he day may have arrived, therefore, when [ex-
pert] testimony can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory"). State
court decisions also reflect this trend. See, e.g., State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ohio
1986) (holding that expert testimony is admissible for the purpose of informing the jury
about factors affecting memory process). Several courts have gone as far as to find it an
abuse of discretion to exclude such expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 935
F.2d 1380, 1400-01 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial for abuse of
discretion); Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242 (holding error harmless due to the presence of
other inculpatory evidence); Smith, 736 F.2d at 1107 (same). Yet, other courts continue to
exclude such evidence altogether. See, e.g., United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315
(11 th Cir. 1984) (holding that expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications is "not
admissible in this circuit").
5o Although the qualification, "unnecessarily," certainly suggests that something more
than inherent suggestiveness is required, the Supreme Court has never clearly defined
what transforms an identification from suggestive to unnecessarily suggestive. See Benja-
min E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial Identification
Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Ky. L.J. 259, 275 (1991). As a result, lower courts
have inconsistently applied this concept. See id. For example, some courts have found that
lineups in which the defendant has a distinguishing feature not shared by others in the
lineup are not unnecessarily suggestive, see, e.g., Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 135-36 (2d
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom, Donnelly v. Raheem, 534 U.S. 1118 (2002); United States v.
Bice-Bay, 701 F.2d 1086, 1089 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983), while others have been more permissive
of such variations, see, e.g., Jarrett v. Headley, 802 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1986) ("It is not
required, however, that all of the photographs in the array be uniform with respect to a
given characteristic."); United States v. Jackson, 509 F.2d 499, 505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(holding that a lineup was not suggestive despite the fact that none but the defendant wore
the "bush hairstyle" that the witness previously described the perpetrator as wearing).
51 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
52 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 106; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197.
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II
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In addition to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, courts
have applied the Sixth Amendment's right to assistance of counsel to
certain eyewitness identifications. This Part begins by examining the
right to counsel jurisprudence, finding that it has proven largely inef-
fective as a means for defendants to challenge potentially corrupted
eyewitness identifications. This Part then explores the evolution of
applying the Due Process Clause to identification testimony deriving
from potentially tainting identification procedures. The underlying
themes-concern for reliability of the identification, the administra-
tion ofjustice, and deterrence-and rules set forth in the due process
case law lay the foundation for concluding that the Raheem approach
is both constitutionally and logically more correct than the non-
Raheem alternative.
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
In United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court considered "whether
courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be excluded
from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses
before trial at a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification
purposes without notice to and in the absence of the accused's ap-
pointed counsel." 53 The Court held that a post-indictment lineup is a
"critical stage" of the prosecution at which point the Sixth Amend-
ment -5 4 entitles a defendant to "'as much.., aid (of counsel) ... as at
the trial itself."' 55 Testimony regarding such an identification is,
53 388 U.S. 218, 219-20 (1967).
54 The Sixth Amendment states that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VI. In Kirby v. Illinois, the Court defined this phrase to mean that the right to counsel does
not attach until "criminal prosecutions" have been initiated. See infra note 60 and accom-
panying text.
55 Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (second alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). Gilbert v. California was argued with Wade and "present[ed] the
same alleged constitutional error in the admission in evidence of in-court identifica-
tions.., considered [in Wade]." 388 U.S. 263, 264 (1967). The relevant lineup in Gilbert
also occurred post-indictment, and therefore the Court determined that the defendant
had a right to have counsel present at that lineup. See id. at 272. As in Wade, the record in
Gilbert did not permit the Court to make an informed judgment about whether the in-court
identifications at the trial had an independent source. Id. Accordingly, the conviction was
vacated pending such a determination. See id. Gilbert also involved the admission of hand-
writing exemplars. Id. at 266. The Court found that "[t]he taking of the [handwriting]
exemplars was not a 'critical' stage of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the
assistance of counsel." Id. at 267. The Court set aside the fact that the exemplars were
taken prior to an indictment and focused on the fact that even if a given exemplar were
unrepresentative, the defendant could produce an unlimited number of exemplars at trial.
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therefore, inadmissible at trial, unless the defendant has made an "in-
telligent waiver" of his right to counsel.56 Nonetheless, even if a pre-
trial identification were suppressed, a witness may still identify the
defendant at trial if the prosecution establishes that the in-court iden-
tification is independently reliable. 57 The Court listed several factors
that trial courts should consider in evaluating whether a witness's in-
court identification derives from sources independent of the uncoun-
seled, pretrial identification: prior opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act, existence of a discrepancy between a pre-lineup descrip-
tion and the defendant's actual description, identification of another
person prior to the lineup, identification of the defendant prior to the
lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and lapse
of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. 58
Just five years after Wade, the Court, in Kirby v. Illinois, refused to
extend the right to counsel to a police station identification of a de-
fendant that occurred shortly after his arrest, but before he had been
formally charged. 59 According to the Kirby Court, Wade applies only
to identifications that occur "at or after the initiation of adversary judi-
cial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."60 The Court
again declined to extend Wade in United States v. Ash.61 Unlike it had
been in Kirby, the Court in Ash was not concerned so much with when
the identification occurred; rather, it recognized that regardless of
when they occur, certain types of identification procedures will not
trigger the right to counsel.62 Specifically, Ash established that a de-
fendant has no right to have counsel present when the police show
photographs of a defendant to a witness even if the defendant has
already been indicted 63 because, unlike lineups, photograph arrays
56 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
57 See id. at 240-41.
58 Id. at 241.
59 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
60 Id. at 689. Wade and Gilbert had left this issue unresolved because the lineups in
each had occurred after both indictment and the appointment of counsel. See Gilbert, 388
U.S. at 269; Wade, 388 U.S. at 220. Gilbert had also set aside the fact that the handwriting
exemplars were taken prior to the indictment and instead focused on the nature of such
evidence. See supra note 55. This being the case, until Kirby, lower courts were in disagree-
ment as to whether counsel was required at pre-indictment identifications. SeeJoseph D.
Grano, A Legal Response to the Inherent Dangers of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, in EYEWIT-
NESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 315, 321 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus
eds., 1984).
61 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
62 See id. at 321. This rationale is similar to that used in Gilbert to uphold the admis-
sion of the handwriting exemplars. See Gilbert, 388 U;S. at 266-67.
63 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 321.
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are not "trial-like confrontation [s]" involving the "presence of the
accused."
64
The application of the Sixth Amendment to certain identifica-
tions has thus proved to be a somewhat hollow victory ;for defendants.
Foremost, the right to counsel will seldom apply to identification pro-
cedures because identifications usually occur before the right to coun-
sel attaches. Additionally, with respect to certain types of
identification procedures, the right to counsel will never attach.
Moreover, even if a defendant's right to counsel is violated, a witness
nonetheless may identify the defendant in court if the government
establishes the accuracy of the identification. Even in situations in
which Wade otherwise appears to offer protection, counsel's role in
the identification process is little more than that of a passive ob-
server.65 And counsel is ill-suited to later testify at trial,66 so even if
counsel were to view something suggestive, the practical import would
be negligible. 67 Indeed, the fact that the Sixth Amendment offers so
little protection in the identification context makes due process an
area quite worthy of the Court's attention.
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process
1. Stovall v. Denno
On the same day that Wade was decided, the Supreme Court, in
Stovall v. Denno, considered for the first time whether the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits the admission of evidence
deriving from suggestive identification procedures. 68 In Stovall, the
64 Id. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65 In Ash, the Court explained Wade as follows: "Counsel was seen by the Court as
being more sensitive to, and aware of, suggestive influences than the accused himself, and
as better able to reconstruct the events at trial." Id. at 312. The Court's rationale indicates
that the lawyer must observe the lineup so that he can decide whether it is tactically wise to
bring out the lineup identification to impeach the credibility of a later in-court identifica-
tion. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 387.
66 Under rule 3.7(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer who is
a witness at trial for his client, except as to an uncontested issue, should withdraw from the
case unless doing so "would work substantial hardship on the client." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (1999). Further, the comments to rule 3.7(a) recognize that
the opposing party has a proper objection if the lawyer's testimony may prejudice the jury.
Id. R. 3.7(a) cmt. For instance, it may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-
witness "should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof." Id. Confusion might
occur because, although a witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge,
an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. Id.
67 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 387-88. Additionally, counsel cannot protect
against the inherent unreliability of many proper procedures. "The constitutional rules
are designed to eliminate the added danger that arises from suggestive police identifica-
tion procedures, but they cannot, of course, remedy deficiencies in a witness's perception
and recall." Grano, supra note 60, at 331.
68 See 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In fact, Stovall was the first case in which the Court found
that "the suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a matter to
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sole eyewitness to the victim's murder was his wife, who was critically
injured in the course of her husband's murder.69
The authorities brought the defendant, who was the key suspect,
to her hospital room for a showup, at which the defendant was the
only black man in the room and was handcuffed to a police officer.70
The witness identified the defendant from her hospital bed, and at
trial both the witness and the police officers who were present in the
hospital room testified as to that identification and made in-court
identifications of the defendant as well.7 '
The Court pronounced that a defendant may claim that "the con-
frontation conducted ... was so unnecessarily suggestive and condu-
cive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due
process of law." 72 According to the Court, in analyzing whether such a
violation has occurred, courts must consider "the totality of the cir-
cumstances. ''7 3 Applying this standard to the facts at hand, the Court
held that the state did not deprive the defendant of due process.74
Although the Court acknowledged that the identification procedure
was suggestive, it found that the procedure did not violate due process
because the immediate hospital confrontation was necessary in light
of the victim's critical condition.75
Stovall dealt with testimony regarding both an out-of-court identi-
fication and an in-court identification, but failed to distinguish the
two circumstances. As a result, some courts interpreted Stovall as man-
dating a single test for both types of identification testimony.76 Other
courts, however, analogized Stovall to Wade, interpreting Stovall as hav-
ing created the following two-tiered test: a pretrial identification
would be inadmissible if it were the product of an unnecessarily sug-
gestive procedure, but a subsequent in-court identification would be
admissible if it had independent indicia of reliability. 77
be argued to the jury." See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). Stovall was a compan-
ion case to Wade and Gilbert, and although counsel did not accompany the defendant at the
identification, the Court chose not to apply Wade-.Gilbert retroactively. See Stoval4 388 U.S.
at 296.
69 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 295.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 301-02.
73 Id. at 302.
74 Id.
75 Id, "No one knew how long [the witness] might live. Faced ... with the knowledge
that [the witness] could not visit the jail, the police followed the only feasible procedure
and took [the defendant] to the hospital room." Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stovall v.
Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1966)).
76 See Note, Identification: Unnecessary Suggestiveness May Not Violate Due Process, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1174 & n.48 (1973) (citing cases).
77 See, e.g., Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 880-83 (4th Cir. 1973); Rudd v. Florida, 477
F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1973).
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2. Simmons v. United States
One year later, in Simmons v. United States, the Court appeared to
confirm the two-tiered approach in determining the admissibility of
an in-court identification following an out-of-court display of a series
of photographs of a single suspect.78 The Court began by discussing
the potential hazards of using photographs for identification purposes
and identified some of the situations that may cause witnesses to err in
identifying perpetrators: if the witness gets only a brief glimpse of a
criminal; if the police show the witness the picture of only a single
individual who generally resembles the person the witness saw; if the
police show the witness pictures of several persons within which the
photograph of one individual recurs; or if the police indicate to the
witness that they have evidence that one of the individuals pictured
committed the crime. 79 The Court recognized that in such cases,
"[r] egardless of how the initial misidentification comes about, the wit-
ness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photo-
graph rather than of the person actually seen."80 Nevertheless, the
Court upheld the use of the eyewitness identification testimony at trial
because the pretrial photographic identifications were not "so imper-
missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification. '"I" According to the Court, a serious
robbery had been committed, and inconclusive clues had led law en-
forcement officials to the defendant.8 2 Because the FBI had a press-
ing need to find the suspects, who were still at large, the Court did not
consider it "unnecessary" for the FBI to resort to the photographic
identification. 83 The Court went on to discuss that there was little
chance that the circumstances led to misidentification, as the robbery
took place at a well-lit bank, and the witnesses had an opportunity to
view the perpetrator for a period of five minutes.8 4 Moreover, these
same witnesses were shown photographs of the suspect the day after
the robbery, and each witness again identified the defendant.8 5
Simmons thus adopted a test similar to the one used in Stovall, but
to be applied when the issue is not the admissibility of the out-of-court
78 See 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
79 Id. at 383.
80 Id. at 383-84; see also discussion supra Part I (discussing the psychological sources of
misidentification).
81 Id. at 384.
82 Id. at 384-85.
83 Id. at 384. According to the Court, it was "essential for the FBI agents swiftly to
determine whether they were on the right track, so that they could properly deploy their
forces ... and, if necessary, alert officials in other cities." Id. at 385.
84 Id. It is noteworthy that these facts satisfy a list of factors, first laid out by the Court
in Neil v. Biggers, that courts should consider when determining the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. See infta text accompanying note 101.
85 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385.
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identification, but rather the admissibility of an in-court identification
following a possibly tainted out-of-court identification. Although the
Court stated that the Simmons standard accorded with the standard
announced in StovalU86 there were in fact two subtle differences be-
tween the standards, which laid the groundwork for later changes.
First, the Simmons Court seemed to devalue, or at least leave in doubt,
the constitutional significance of the "unnecessarily" portion of the
"unnecessarily suggestive" test by continuing its analysis even after the
identification procedure was deemed necessary. Second, in Stovall,
the Court asked, the objective and theoretical question of whether the
pretrial identification procedures employed were "conducive" to mis-
identification.8 7 In Simmons, on the other hand, the Court focused
primarily on the subjective question of whether the procedure in a
pretrial lineup gave rise to a "likelihood" of irreparable misidentifica-
tion in light of case-specific circumstances.8 8 The objective nature of
the Stovall test does not demand heavy inquiry into reliability factors,
such as the quality of lighting, that the more subjective Simmons test
requires. The major difference between the test set forth in Stovall
and the one adopted in Simmons, therefore, is that the Simmons test
concentrates more on case-specific reliability, whereas the Stovall test
focuses more on procedure generally.
Still, both the Stovall and Simmons tests discuss the necessity of the
procedure utilized and the reliability of the resulting identification as
factors justifying the admission of evidence obtained through an oth-
erwise suggestive procedure. Neither Stovall nor Simmons made clear,
however, whether a suggestive procedure could be justified only if
both factors were present. That is to say, if an identification proce-
dure were suggestive yet reliable, would it nevertheless be inadmissi-
ble if no exigent circumstances made the procedure necessary?8 9 In
two subsequent cases, Neil v. Biggers" and Manson v. Brathwaite,91 the
Court fully addressed this question.
3. Neil v. Biggers
In Neil v. Biggers, the Court considered the admissibility of an un-
necessarily suggestive out-of-court identification (rather than a sugges-
86 See id. at 384.
87 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967); see also Evan J. Mandery, Due
Process Considerations of In-Court Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 389, 392-94 (1996) (discuss-
ing Stovall and Simmons).
88 See Simmons, 390 U:S. at 384; see also Mandery, supra note 87, at 393-94.
89 See Connie Mayer, Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Based on Pretrial
Photographic Arrays, 13 PACE L. REV. 815, 824 (1994).
90 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
91 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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tive yet necessary identification).92 The Court first reiterated that "the
primary evil to be avoidedis 'a very substantial likelihood of irrepara-
ble misidentification.' '"9 3 The Court went on to state that even
though the previous phrase was "coined as a standard for determining
whether an in-court identification would be admissible in the wake of
a suggestive out-of-court identification, with the deletion of 'irrepara-
ble' it serves equally well as a standard for the admissibility of testi-
mony concerning the out-of-court identification itself."94
The Court also mentioned that it was not clear from earlier cases
whether unnecessary suggestiveness alone requires the exclusion of
evidence. 95 Prior to Biggers, many lower courts had applied a per se
exclusionary rule in deciding whether an out-of-court identification
should be admissible.9 6 Under this rule, if the prosecution were to
introduce evidence concerning a pretrial identification based on an
unnecessarily suggestive procedure, any subsequent conviction would
be automatically reversed and a new trial' ordered regardless of
whether the prosecution could establish an independent source for
the identification.9 7 In contrast, other courts had been using a "total-
ity of the circumstances" approach. This approach permits admission
of identification evidence if, despite the suggestiveness of the proce-
dure, the out-of-court identification is reliable."8 The Court declined
to decide between these approaches because both the confrontation
and trial in Biggers preceded the Court's decision in Stovall, which was
92 See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99.
93 Id. at 198 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384).
94 Id. By using this standard, which was set out in Simmons and which focuses on case-
specific reliability and not procedure generally, the Court blurred the distinction between
Stovall-type cases (such as Biggers), in which the identification at issue is the out-of-court
identification, and Simmons-type cases, where the in-court identification is at issue. See
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99. Foster v.'California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), is the only
case before Biggers in which the Supreme Court held that the admission of identification
testimony violated due process. In Foster, the witness failed to identify the defendant the
first time he confronted him despite a suggestive lineup. See 394 U.S. at 441-43. The
police then arranged a showup, but the witness could only tentatively identify the defen-
dant. Id. at 443. At yet another lineup, the witness finally gave a definite identification. Id.
at 441-42. The Court held that all of the identifications were inadmissible because they
were "all but inevitable" under the circumstances. Id. at 443.
96 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110.
97 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99. Apparently, before Biggers, several scholars thought
that this test was implied from Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall. Grano, supra note 60, at 327.
Indeed, this rule is a logical outgrowth of the fact that Stovall focused primarily on objec-
tive procedures while both Simmons and Wade stressed reliability when dealing with in-court
identifications. See supra notes 57, 87-88 and accompanying text. According to Biggers, the
purpose of such a per se rule is to deter police from using less reliable procedures if more
reliable procedures are available. 409 U.S. at 199. This rule thus is prophylactic in nature
and not based on the assumption that in every instance the admission of evidence of such a
confrontation offends due process.
98 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110.
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the first case in which the Court gave notice that the suggestiveness of
an identification procedure was anything more than one factor for the
jury to weigh in evaluating identification testimony.99 The Court then
turned to the "central question" of "whether under the 'totality of the
circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the con-
frontation procedure was suggestive."'100 The Court stated that the
factors to consider in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification
include: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the perpetrator at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention at the time of
the crime; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the
perpetrator; (4) the witness's level of certainty when identifying the
defendant as the perpetrator at the time of the confrontation; and (5)
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation."0 "
The victim in Biggers had been raped and had spent almost a half-
hour with her assailant,' 02 satisfying the first factor; the lighting was
adequate,10 3 satisfying the second factor; and her description of the
perpetrator was accurate and detailed, satisfying the third factor. 10 4
Although the identification failed the fifth factor because there was a
lapse of seven months between the rape and confrontation, 0 5 the vic-
tim made no identifications prior to the identification at issue and her
record for reliability was good. l06 The Court therefore concluded
that, on balance, no substantial likelihood of misidentification existed
and consequently that the identification evidence was admissible. 10 7
4. Manson v. Brathwaite
In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court was faced with addressing the
question that Biggers left unanswered-should the Court adopt a per
se rule barring all testimony regarding an out-of-court identification
99 See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. Because of this fact, the Court waited until Manson v.
Brathwaite to fully dispose of this issue. Prior to Stovall, the Court had not recognized that
unnecessary suggestiveness could potentially violate due process. See Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 299 (1967). Instead, when lower courts admitted suggestive confrontations, the
Court assumed that juries could properly weigh the effect of such suggestiveness. See id. at
299-300 ("The overwhelming majority of American courts have always treated the evi-
dence question not as one of admissibility but as one of credibility for the jury.").
100 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
101 Id. at 199-200.
102 See id. at 193-94.
103 See id. at 194.
104 See id. at 194-95, 200-01.
105 The Court expressed concern about this time lapse, stating that it "would be a
seriously negative factor in most cases." Id. at 201.
106 Id.
107 Id. Therefore, even though the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the identi-
fication was admissible because it was reliable. It should be noted that even if the pretrial
identification passes muster under Biggers, a witness's subsequent failure to identify the
defendant at trial may call the original identification into question. See, e.g., United States
v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1999).
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stemming from an unnecessarily suggestive procedure or a totality-of-
the-circumstances approach under which such testimony would be ad-
missible if it possesses certain indicia of reliability?10 8 Brathwaite re-
solved this conflict in favor of the latter approach. 10 9 The Court based
its decision on three factors. First, the Court recognized that the
"driving force" behind Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall was concern for the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.110 The Court reasoned that
the per se rule extends too far because "its application automatically
and peremptorily ... keeps evidence from the jury that is reliable and
relevant" without permitting the court to consider "alleviating fac-
tors."'11 The totality approach, on the other hand, is flexible enough
to allow the admission of such evidence despite suggestive
procedures. 112
The Court next focused on the need to deter suggestive behav-
ior." 3 It acknowledged that the per se approach had a more signifi-
cant deterrent effect than the totality approach, but found that the
totality approach also influences police behavior: "[P] olice will guard
against unnecessarily suggestive procedures ... for fear that their ac-
tions will lead to the exclusion of identifications as unreliable." ' 14 Fi-
nally, the Court considered the effect of admitting identification
testimony, despite the use of suggestive procedures, on the adminis-
tration ofjustice. l 15 It recognized that the per se approach might per-
mit guilty defendants to go free by excluding reliable evidence and
stated that in "cases in which the identification is reliable despite an
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure [,] reversal is a Dra-
conian sanction."' 1 6
108 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977).
109 See id. at 114. In fact, the Court indicated that Biggers could be interpreted to pro-
vide the answer to the Court's question in Brathwaite. See id. at 109. According to the
Court, Biggers held that "[t]he admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnec-
essary identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the identification
possesses sufficient aspects of reliability." Id. at 106. However, the Court acknowledged
that Biggers did not ultimately answer the question posed in Brathwaite because the confron-
tation and trial in Biggers preceded the Court's decision in Stovall. See id. at 107; see also
supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Stovall, Biggers, and Brathwaite).
110 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 111-12. Wade allows reliable in-court identification testi-
mony regardless of whether the right to an attorney was denied. See United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 239-42 (1967). It should be noted that the actual driving force behind
Stovall, as opposed to Simmons, was procedural concerns, even though reliability was also
important in Stovall. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Mii Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.
112 See id. at 112.
113 See id.
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 Id. at 112-13.
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Ultimately, the Court concluded that "reliability is the linchpin in
determining the admissibility of identification testimony,"' 1 7 and that
courts should consider the factors set forth in Biggers in determining
the reliability -of identifications.I 8 These factors should be evaluated
and then weighed against the "corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself.""19
Applying this framework to the facts at hand, the Brathwaite Court
held that an out-of-court, single-photograph identification was admis-
sible. 12 The witness was an undercover police officer who had pur-
chased drugs from a dealer. 12 ' The Court noted that the officer paid
close attention to the drug dealer's features, gave an accurate descrip-
tion shortly thereafter, and viewed the dealer from close range for
two to three minutes in adequate lighting.122 These indicators of reli-
ability were not "outweighed by the corrupting effect of the chal-
lenged identification itself."' 2 3  The Court went on to state that
"[a] lthough it plays no part in our analysis," all the assurance as to the
reliability of the identification is "hardly undermined by the facts that
respondent was arrested in the very apartment where the sale had
taken place, and that he acknowledged his frequent visits to that
apartment." 124
Justice Marshall,joined by justice Brennan, argued in dissent that
"Stovall and Simmons established two different due process tests for two
very different situations."'125 He proposed that Stovall should govern
pretrial identifications, and that courts should exclude evidence with-
out regard to reliability if the identification is based on an unnecessa-
rily suggestive procedure. 126 Simmons, on the other hand, should
govern in-court identifications, the admissibility of which should turn
on reliability. 127 Biggers adopted reliability as the guiding factor in de-
117 ld. at 114.
118 See id. For a list of these factors, see supra text accompanying note 101.
119 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
120 See id. at 117.
121 Id. at 99-100.
122 Id. at 114-15. These facts are certainly illustrative of several Biggers factors. The
good lighting, close range, and time the officer spent with the perpetrator fall tinder the
first Biggers factor-the witness's opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time of the
crime. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). The fact that the police officer paid
close attention to the drug dealer goes toward the second Biggers factor-the witness's
degree of attention at the time of the offense. See id. The officer's high level of certainty
supports the fourth Biggers factor-the witness's level of certainty when identifying the de-
fendant as the perpetrator at the time of the confrontation. See id. Finally, the officer's
accurate description shortly after the drug deal satisfies the fifth Biggers factor-the length
of time between the crime and confrontation. See id. at 199-200.
123 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 122-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1116 [Vol. 88:1097
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
termining the admissibility of both types of identifications and, ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, should be condemned for doing so.'12
Justice Marshall also contended that there were "two significant
distinctions"' 29 between the per se rule and other exclusionary rules:
(1) the identification evidence suppressed under the per se rule is not
"forever lost,"130 because, "when a prosecuting attorney learns that
there has been a suggestive confrontation, he can easily arrange an-
other lineup conducted under scrupulously fair conditions";13 t and
(2) "[s]uggestively obtained eyewitness testimony is excluded ... pre-
cisely because of its unreliability and concomitant irrelevance,"'132 and
exclusion "both protects the integrity of the truth-seeking function of
the trial and discourages police use of needlessly inaccurate and inef-
fective investigatory methods."133
III
RAHEEM V. KELLY. THE COMPETING DUE PROCESS
ANALYSES APPLIED
Although the Supreme Court has articulated the standards for
admitting eyewitness identification testimony that is challenged under
the Due Process Clause, as is often the case, lower courts disagree as to
the exact application of the Court's precedent. Specifically, the cir-
cuits disagree about the proper role of corroborative evidence in due
process analysis of eyewitness identifications. This Part examines
Raheem v. Kelly,' 34 the case that best illustrates this tension.
A. Background
In January of 1976, three men robbed a bar.135 One of the men,
"described principally as wearing a black leather coat," shot and killed
one of the bar owners. 136 After two trials, Jehan Abdor Raheem was
convicted as the shooter. 13 7 Ultimately, Raheem successfully argued
that his convictions should be vacated "on the ground that he was
128 See id. at 123-24 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
129 Id. at 126 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 126-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This contention seems misplaced and is
contrary to studies finding that once tainted, a witness's memory may remain distorted. See
discussion supra Part I.
132 Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134 Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nora, Donnelly v.
Raheem, 534 U.S. 1118 (2002).
135 See id. at 125.
136 Id.
137 See id.
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denied due process at trial by the admission of unreliable identifica-
tion evidence."' 38
1. The Robbery and the Murder
On January 4, 1976, three strangers entered a bar in Brooklyn,
New York. 139 At the time, several patrons (Cooke, Hayward, Moore,
and Shiloh), the bar's owner (Hill), and the bartender (Dukes), were
inside watching a football game. 140 After entering, one of the stran-
gers stayed near the front window, while the others went briefly into
the restroom.14' Upon returning from the restroom, the strangers
separated; one positioned himself near the patrons, while the other
approached Hill and began a conversation.142 Shortly thereafter, a
shot was fired.' 43 The patrons and bartender did not see the actual
shooting, but turned in time to see Hill fall to the floor dead. 144 They
also saw a gun in the hand of the stranger who had been closest to
Hill.' 45 Then, the man who had been standing behind Shiloh, Cooke,
and Moore brandished a gun and announced a robbery.146 After tak-
ing personal items from Shiloh, Cooke, Hayward, and Moore as well
as money from the cash register, 147 the three robbers fled the scene in
Moore's car. 148
2. The Investigation and the Identifications
Shortly after the crime, the police interviewed all the witnesses
and obtained their descriptions of the robbers, all of which empha-
sized that the shooter was wearing a black leather coat. 149 The subse-
quent police investigation was unusual in several respects. First, six
days after the shooting, the police showed Cooke and Shiloh a photo-
graphic spread. 15 Although both independently identified the same
person as the shooter, the police later determined that this person
138 Id.
139 See id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. The one officer who testified at the Wade hearing (pretrial suppression hear-
ings regarding identification testimony) maintained that the descriptions in the police re-
port stated only that the shooter was wearing a three quarter length black coat. See id.
However, Shiloh and Cooke testified to slightly more detailed descriptions at the Wade
hearing and at trial. Id.
150 Id. at 126.
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could not possibly have been involved in the robbery.1 51 The police
then showed Cooke, Shiloh, and Dukes a lineup, and two of them
identified Raheem, who was participating in the lineup "purely by
happenstance."'152 The police had set up this lineup after receiving a
tip from an informant that the killer was another man named Lindsay
Webb.'15 3 Because the police could not find five officers who looked
similar to Webb for the lineup, they included Raheem and another
arrestee, both of whom had been arrested in connection with wholly
separate crimes.1 54 Raheem was the only person in the lineup wearing
a black leather coat.155 Shiloh could not identify anybody at his first
viewing of the lineup, and Dukes was never able to identify any-
body. 15 6 Cooke surprisingly identified Raheem.157 After both Shiloh
and Cooke viewed the lineup, they spoke in the waiting room, but
supposedly did not talk about the lineup. 158 Following his conversa-
tion with Cooke, Shiloh asked to view the lineup again and subse-
quently identified Raheem. 159 Both Cooke and Shiloh mentioned
that the black leather coat Raheem was wearing factored into their
identification.160 Both men also mentioned, however, that they would
have picked Raheem out of the lineup even if he had not been wear-
ing a black leather coat. 16 1
Although Raheem remained in police custody for a separate
crime, he was neither charged nor accused of the Hill homicide until
several weeks after the lineup.162 During that time, the investigation
into Hill's homicide continued, but did not produce any additional
evidence against Raheem. 63 A month later, the "final twist" in the
151 See id.
152 Id. These two misidentifications are illustrative of the fact that witnesses often feel
that there exists no "none-of-the-above" answer. See Malpass & Devine, supra note 45, at
483; see also.supra Part I (discussing the reliability of eyewitness identifications).
153 Raheem, 257 F.3d at 126.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 127. This coat was similar to the one used in the robbery/murder. See id.
However, it was not so identical that it was likely to have been the one used in the crime.
See id.
156 Id. at 126.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 127.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 127-28. At the Wade hearing, Cooke testified as follows: "And I could tell
from his, you know-his coat is another thing. He had on a leather coat that I
remembered." Id. at 127 (emphasis omitted). Shiloh was asked at the Wade. hearing:
"[D]id you make the identification basically on the facts that the man in the bar on January
the 4th was wearing a neat [ ] black leather coat, and [Raheem], number one in the
lineup, was wearing a black leather coat?" Id. (emphasis omitted) (second alteration in
original). Shiloh answered: "Right." Id.
161 Id. at 127-28. Specifically, both Cooke and Shiloh claimed that they also
remembered Raheem's face. Id.
162 See id. at 128
163 See id.
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case occurred: according to Detective Crabb, Raheem summoned
Crabb to his cell and confessed to murdering Hill. 164 Crabb took
notes during their conversation, but neither showed them to Raheem
nor asked Raheem to initial them. 165
B. Raheem's First Trial
The state trial court denied Raheem's motions to suppress both
the confession and the identification. 166 Therefore, the court permit-
ted both Cooke and Shiloh to identify Raheem as the shooter at
trial.167 Moreover, the court permitted Crabb to testify that Raheem
had confessed.' 68 The jury convicted Raheem. 169 He appealed his
conviction, challenging the admission of the identification and con-
fession testimony. 170 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, ruled that the trial court should have suppressed Crabb's
testimony and ordered a new trial, 17' but held that suppressing the
identifications was unwarranted because the identification procedures
were fair. 172
C. Raheem's Second Trial
Shiloh and Cooke identified Raheem as the shooter at the second
trial, 173 and Raheem was found guilty once more. 174 Raheem ap-
pealed again, alleging that the identifications were "the product of an
unconstitutionally suggestive lineup." 175 For the second time, the Ap-
pellate Division found this constitutional challenge to be "'without
merit."'1 76 The Appellate Division granted Raheem leave to appeal to
the New York Court of Appeals, which held that "'[t] he lower court's
determination that the lineup was not suggestive involves a mixed
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 ld.
167 See id. at 129.
168 See id.
169 Id.
170 Id. Raheem did not argue that his confession never took place, but argued instead
that because he was represented by counsel in a concurrent case, and his confession in this
case took place without that counsel present, his confession could not be used against him
as a matter of New York state constitutional law. See id. The New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, found this argument persuasive and held that his confession was inad-
missible. See id.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 130.
173 [d.
174 Id. at 131.
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting People v. Whitaker, 468 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)).
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question of law and fact which is supported by the record and thus is
beyond review in this court.'"177
Raheem next petitioned the federal district court for habeas
corpus relief.178 Although the district court agreed that the lineup
was impermissibly suggestive, it concluded that the identifications
were nevertheless reliable because there was other general corrobora-
tive evidence of Raheem's guilt.179 The three sources of corrobora-
tion were "Raheem's possession of a black leather coat, his confession,
and the fact that he was convicted of other murders, showing a 'pro-
pensity . . . to kill."' 1 80 In light of this evidence, the court denied
habeas corpus relief, but granted a certificate of appealability to the
Second Circuit.181
D The Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit held that the identification evidence would
be admissible if (a) the procedures were not suggestive or (b) the
identification had independent reliability. 18 2 In applying this stan-
dard to the facts of the case, the Second Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court that the identification procedures were unnecessarily
suggestive because Raheem appeared in his black leather coat, which
both Cooke and Shiloh had emphasized in their eyewitness descrip-
tions on several occasions.183 However, the court disagreed with the
district court's finding that Cooke's and Shiloh's identifications were
reliable because of corroborative evidence of Raheem's general
guilt,18 4 reiterating that "in the identification context," reliability
"means essentially that the witness's recollection was
'[un]distorted." ' ' 8 5 In order to determine whether the witnesses'
identifications of Raheem were reliable despite the unduly suggestive
identification procedures, the court looked instead to the factors set
forth in Biggers'86 because, according to the court, those are the fac-
tors that Brathwaite requires courts to consider. 8 7 Therefore, unlike
177 Id. (quoting People v. Whitaker, 476 N.E.2d 294, 296 n.*1 (N.Y. 1985)).
178 See id.
179 Id. at 131-32.
180 Id. at 132 (alteration in original) (quoting Raheem v. Kelly, 98 F. Supp. 2d 295, 316
(E.D.N.Y. 2000)). The district court found that, taken together, the three sources of cor-
roboration were sufficient tojustify allowing thejury to weigh the eyewitness testimony. See
id.
181 See id. at 132-33.
182 Id. at 133.
183 See id. at 135-37.
184 See id. at 138.
185 Id. at 140 (alteration in original) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112
(1977)).
186 See supra text accompanying note 101.
187 See Raheem, 257 F.3d at 135, 138-40. For a discussion of the Biggers factors, see supra
text accompanying note 101.
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the district court, the Second Circuit did not consider Raheem's pos-
session of a black leather coat, his confession, or the fact that he had
been convicted of other murders to be relevant to the reliability of the
identification. 8 The court ultimately held that the identification at
issue was unreliable because of the witnesses' inability to describe the
murderer's face, their misidentification of the other gunman who had
been closest to them, and the undue emphasis they placed on the
black leather coat in their descriptions of the shooter.189
In rejecting the district court's reliance on corroborative evi-
dence of general guilt, the Second Circuit clearly articulated its disa-
greement with other circuits to the extent that their assessment of an
identification's reliability-as distinct from any harmless-error analy-
sis-may include evidence unrelated to the identification that cor-
roborates the defendant's guilt. 19 1 The court instead agreed with
those circuits that consider evidence corroborative of guilt, but unre-
lated to the identification, only when assessing whether the error in
admitting identification testimony resulting from unnecessarily sug-
gestive procedures was harmless. 191 The Second Circuit stated: "'In-
dependent evidence of culpability will not cure a tainted
identification procedure, nor will exculpatory information bar admis-
sion of reliable identification testimony."1 92
Finally, the court determined that admitting the identification
was not harmless error because there was little evidence of Raheem's
guilt apart from that impermissible identification.193 In fact, other
than the identification, the prosecution had presented no evidence
tying Raheem to the murder. 9 4 Therefore, the court overturned
Raheem's conviction. 95
188 See Raheem, 257 F.3d at 140.
189 Id. at 141.
190 See id. at 140-41; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing ap-
proaches adopted by other circuits).
191 Raheem, 257 F.3d at 140-41; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
192 See Raheem, 257 F.3d at 141 (quoting United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1128
(3d Cir. 1995)).
193' See id. at 142-43.
194 See id. at 143. As previously mentioned, after Raheem's first trial, the Appellate
Division held that Crabb's testimony that Raheem had confessed was inadmissible. See
supra note 170 and accompanying text.
195 See Raheem, 257 F.3d at 143. It should be noted that Raheem was not released from
prison after the court overturned his conviction because he was serving time for other
convictions. See id.
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IV
ANALYZING PRECEDENT AND IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING THE SUPREME
COURT'S IDENTIFICATION CASES
Although, in Raheem v. Kelly, the Second Circuit acknowledged
the current circuit split regarding the proper role of corroborative
evidence in due process analysis of identification testimony based on
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, it offered little rea-
soning to support its choice of position. The court only stated that its
view is consistent with Brathwaite.196 Similarly, other courts that have
considered this issue have failed to provide in-depth analyses as to why
courts should or should not take into account corroborative evidence
of general guilt when determining the reliability of an identifica-
tion. 197 The best way to resolve this circuit split is to focus on the
three main considerations set forth in Brathwaite-reliability of the evi-
dence, the administration of justice, and deterrence-which, as men-
tioned above, led the Brathwaite Court to reject a per se approach in
favor of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 19 Although the
split identified in Raheem does not deal directly with the merits of the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach, Brathwaite spoke generally to
considerations in the identification context.'"  In analyzing the
Brathwaite factors, this Note considers three larger principles of the
American legal system and constitutional jurisprudence- (1) appro-
priateness of process, (2) accuracy of outcomes, and (3) global appro-
priateness of outcomes.21 1°
A. Reliability of the Evidence
This subpart begins by examining Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the proper role of reliability-Brathwaie's first concern-in due
process analysis of eyewitness identification testiomony. In an effort
to sharpen this inquiry, this subpart then applies larger constitutional
principles of appropriateness of process and accuracy of outcomes to
this concern.
196 See id. at 140.
197 For example, the Fifth Circuit provided only a terse explanation of its chosen ap-
proach in United States v. Rogers: "The bulk of the evidence presented at trial could not be
used in our ... analysis of whether [the eyewitness's] identification of [the defendant] was
reliable because admissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by
the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not
whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence." 126 F.3d
655, 659 (5th Cir. 1997).
198 See supra Part II.B.4.
199 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-13 (1977).
200 Although these three factors sometimes overlap, they remain largely separate con-
cerns. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (1984).
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1. Strictly Interpreting Precedent
Reliability of the "evidence" was the "linchpin" in Brathwaite211
and the driving force behind Biggers, Simmons, and Wade.2112 "Reliabil-
ity" clearly refers to the reliability of the identification testimony itself,
and not to the reliability of the overall outcome-an obvious, yet im-
portant distinction on which this Note focuses. Such a conclusion is
inevitable for a number of reasons. First, the word that the Brathwaite
Court chose to use, "evidence," in speaking of reliability is significant,
because "evidence" logically must mean less than the overall out-
come.2113 Second, the Court considered the reliability of the overall
outcome in addressing its third concern-the administration of jus-
tice-and thus must have meant something different by the word "evi-
dence,"' 114 lest we presume the Court was simply being superfluous.
Third, the Brathwaite Court stated that both the per se and the totality-
of-the-circumstances approaches address the reliability of the identifi-
cation itself, rather than the reliability of the overall outcome, because
both approaches prevent unreliable identifications from reaching the
jury.2 ° 5
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Biggers, the reliability of
identification testimony-the "evidence"-has been the courts' sole
inquiry. Biggers extended the reasoning behind Simmons to Stovall-type
situations, in which the identification at issue is an out-of-court identi-
fication 20" (not an in-court identification, as in Simmons2 (7), and in so
doing, clearly shifted the focus in such situations away from whether
the police identification procedure was "unnecessarily suggestive"2 08
and "conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" 209 to whether
the identification is reliable.2 ° The only question since Biggers, there-
fore, is "whether the witness is identifying the defendant solely on the
201 Se' Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
202 See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (noting that "[i]t is the likelihood
of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process"); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (stating that a suggestive identification will be set aside
only if there is a likelihood of misidentification); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 236-38,
240-41 (1967) (stating that a defendant cannot properly reconstruct the fairness and relia-
bility of the identification procedures without a lawyer present at an identification, but that
a court may permit a witness to identify the defendant in court if indicia of reliability exist
regardless of whether the defendant was improperly denied a lawyer).
203 To elaborate, because evidence is what leads to a conviction or acquittal, and be-
cause multiple pieces of evidence are almost always used, the term "evidence" must imply
less than the overall result of the trial.
204 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112-13.
205 See id. at 112.
206 Set supra text accompanying note 71.
207 See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 382-84.
208 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
209 id.
210 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 122 (Maishall, J., dissenting).
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basis of his memory of events at the time of the crime."2'I Conse-
quently, courts may consider corroborative evidence that sheds light
on the reliability of the identification itself. The question becomes
whether corroborative evidence of general guilt sheds such light.
The Supreme Court in Brathwaite recognized that the per se ap-
proach was overinclusive because it kept evidence from the jury with-
out considering "alleviating factors."2 12 The inquiry remains the
same, but can be reworded as follows: is corroborative evidence of
general guilt an alleviating factor? The answer is not patently clear
from the language in Brathwaite, but the Supreme Court's pre-Raheem
opinions indicate that the answer is no. For instance, the Court in
Brathwaite mentions that the factors a court must consider in assessing
the reliability of an identification are those that the Court set forth in
Biggers, none of which deal with general evidence of guilt.213 Moreo-
ver, in determining the reliability of the identification in Brathwaite,
the Court weighed only the Biggers factors and explicitly stated that
existing corroborative evidence of guilt "plays no part in our analy-
sis."214 Additionally, in Simmons, the Court focused on similar, Biggers-
type factors: the bank's lighting, the period of time the witness had to
view the defendant, and the time that elapsed before the witness iden-
tified the defendant. 215 Finally, in Wade, although in the context of
the right to counsel, the Court listed several Biggers-type factors to be
considered in evaluating whether an in-court identification is properly
derived from sources independent of the uncounseled, pretrial
identification. 216
The fact that the Court in Brathwaite, Simmons, and Biggers did not
consider corroborative evidence of general guilt in these analyses is
highly probative of the conclusion that courts should consider only
Biggers-type factors in assessing the reliability of identifications. How-
ever, this fact is not dispositive. Indeed, one could argue that because
the Court admitted the identifications in Simmons, Biggers, and
Brathwaite after considering only Biggers-type factors, 217 the Court did
211 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 112.
213 See id. at 114. It should be noted that the factors the Court applies to determine
reliability are similar to those factors that psychologists believe affect identification accu-
racy. See supra Part 1. Some argue, however, that these factors are not sufficiently corre-
lated with psychological phenomena. See Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 275-81.
214 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116.
215 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384-86 (1968). At the time, Stovall
would not have permitted consideration of such evidence because the question in Stovall
focused on the unnecessary suggestiveness of the identification procedure and not on the
identification's reliability. See discussion supra Part II.B. I.
216 See supra text accompanying note 58.
217 Simmons obviously did not refer to these factors as Biggers factors because Simmons
preceded Biggers.
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not need to consider non-Biggers-type factors as part of its respective
analyses even if the Court thought that such factors (that is, evidence
of general guilt) could properly be considered. This interpretation
may help explain the language in Brathwaite that general corrobora-
tive evidence of outside guilt "plays no part in our analysis." 21 s How-
ever, if the Court wanted to depart from precedent that considered
only Biggers-type factors, Brathwaite certainly offered ample opportu-
nity, which factJustice Stevens recognized in his concurrence when he
remarked that although it is sometimes difficult to put general evi-
dence of guilt to one side, the Court "carefully avoid[ed] this pitfall
and correctly relie[d] only on appropriate indicia of the reliability of
the identification itself."21'9
Therefore, Supreme Court precedent strongly supports the con-
clusion that courts should consider only Biggers-type factors, and not
general evidence of guilt, in determining an identification's reliability.
Of course, because these cases do not explicitly exclude the possibility
that courts may consider non-Biggers type factors, additional and more
theoretical analysis in support of this conclusion is beneficial.
2. Appropriateness of Process
This Note's analysis now shifts to considering the appropriateness
of the respective processes used by the Raheem and non-Raheem circuits
to determine the reliability of identification testimony. First, the
Raheem approach is simply more logical. If an identification proce-
dure is "unnecessarily suggestive," it is probably so because corrobora-
tive evidence of guilt made the police think that the defendant was
the perpetrator.2 11 Confronted with such a procedure, the witness
will most likely pick the suspect against whom the police have the
most corroborative evidence of guilt, not because that evidence makes
it more likely that the witness independently remembers the defen-
dant as the perpetrator, but because the lineup procedures "suggest"
the witness should pick him. 22 ' Using this evidence to subsequently
support the independence of an identification is nothing short of ab-
218 Brathwaile, 432 U.S. at 116.
219 Id. at 118 (Stevens, J., concurring).
220 The Court articulated this sentiment in Wade:
[T]he fact that the police themselves have, in a given case, little or no
doubt that the man put up for identification has committed the offense,
and that their chief pre-occupation is with the problem of getting sufficient
proof.., involves a danger that this persuasion may communicate itself...
to the witness in some way.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967) (first alteration in original) (quoting Wil-
liams & Hammelmann, supra note 1, at 483). However, in some cases, like Raheem, the
defendant was not the suspect in the lineup.
221 See supra text accompanying note 43.
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surd.222 Additionally, even if the police did not have a defendant in
mind at the time of the out-of-court identification, corroborative evi-
dence of general guilt is hardly, if at all, related to whether a witness
independently identified the defendant, but rather is related to
whether the defendant is in fact "the right guy. '2 23
This distinction leads to the second fault with the non-Raheem ap-
proach: if a court considers evidence of general guilt in assessing the
reliability of identification testimony, it fails to adequately consider
the procedural aspects of the trial and therefore violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause. In determining the appropriateness of process under the
Due Process Clause, defining "process" is a necessary first step. Al-
though it is quite difficult to pinpoint the precise meaning or inten-
tion behind the Due Process Clause, Edward Corwin has noted that
the phrase "process" probably was intended "to consecrate a mode of
procedure."224 Similarly, John Hart Ely has stated that "the proper func-
tion of the Due Process Clause [is] that of guaranteeing fair proce-
dures."225 Both correctly stress that due process should be defined
with a focus on the procedural aspects of a trial. The Supreme Court
has expressed this notion by stating that procedures used to deter-
mine a defendant's guilt or innocence must comport with "fundamen-
tal ideas of fair play and justice."226 Due process, then, seems to
encompass the concept of fundamental fairness in trial procedures. 227
Process should be heavily scrutinized with regard to identification
testimony because, as Benjamin Rosenberg has observed, unlike most
other improper law enforcement activities, suggestive eyewitness iden-
tification procedures do not further any valid law enforcement
need. 228 For example, an invasive search under the Fourth Amend-
ment may be unconstitutional, yet at the same time may further the
valid law enforcement need of collecting relevant evidence. 22 9 Unnec-
essarily suggestive identification procedures, by contrast, create unreli-
able evidence in cases in which reliable evidence otherwise could have
222 Of course, if general evidence of guilt is collected after the identification, its effects
are not so damaging.
223 This evidence is not related to any factors that psychologists agree affect perception
and memory. See supra Part I. In contrast, Biggers factors are related. See infra note 278.
224 EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 114 (1948).
225 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsr: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 19 (1980)
(emphasis added).
226 In reOliver, 333 U.S. 257, 282 (1948) (Rutledge,J., concurring); see alsoJoint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter,J., concurring)
(observing due process "[r]epresent[s] a profound attitude of fairness between man and
man, and more particularly between the individual and government").
227 But the Court has recognized that the meaning of "fundamental fairness" is "as
opaque as its importance is lofty." Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs. of Durham County,
N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
228 See Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 291.
229 See id.
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been collected, and according to Rosenberg, the state should have a
special obligation to behave correctly in cases in which it creates
rather than merely collects evidence.2 3 1 1
With a procedural focus in mind, admissibility of identification
testimony should rest on whether the identification was likely well-
grounded, not whether it was likely correct.2 _3 1 General corroborative
evidence is probative only as to whether the witness identified "the
right guy"23 2 (end-result- or outcome-oriented), rather than whether
the witness independently identified the defendant (procedure- or
process-oriented). Therefore, it is more appropriate for courts to con-
sider general evidence of guilt only on appeal during any harmless-
error analysis.
The approach utilized by the Second Circuit in Raheen23 3-" makes
constitutional sense precisely because of this process/outcome distinc-
tion. The distinction previously mentioned between the reliability of
the individual piece of evidence (in this case, the identification), and
the reliability of the overall outcome of the trial parallels the distinc-
tion between process- and outcome-oriented constitutional jurispru-
dence in general. The former consideration assures that the process
of admitting an identification is within constitutionally permissible
limits. The latter consideration, however, does not concern itself with
process, but rather solely with the accuracy of the end result. To be
sure, both approaches focus on reliability, but the process-oriented
approach asks whether the process of admitting the identification evi-
dence is unconstitutional in light of the reliability of that evidence,
while the outcome-oriented approach asks solely whether the end re-
sult is reliable.
It is indeed tautological that the Due Process Clause requires
proper process, which is necessarily distinct from outcome. Table 1
illustrates how a trial outcome may be inaccurate even though the
process employed in achieving the result is proper, and vice versa. Be-
ginning with the proposition that a person accused of a crime is either
guilty or innocent, several distinct relationships between process and
outcome are possible.
As Table 1 illustrates, trials that employ either proper or im-
proper processes can end with either a proper or improper outcome.
Adding a given procedure to a trial (or removing one), therefore, may
have either a positive or negative impact on the accuracy of end re-
23(0 See id. at 292 n.158 (analogizing pretrial identification procedures to entrapment).
231 See supra note 197.
232 See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 695-96 (4th Cir. 1996) (implying
that courts should consider evidence of general guilt when evaluating the admissibility of
an identification because it helps determine whether a witness identified the correct
person).
233 See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
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TAmLE I
CORRELATION BETWEEN PROCESS AND OUTCOME
Correlation
Between Proper
Guilt/ Type of Accurate Process/Accurate
Innocence Process Result Outcome Outcome
Guilty Proper Acquitted NO NO
Guilty Proper Convicted YES YES
Guilty Improper Acquitted NO YES
Guilty Improper Convicted YES NO
Innocent Proper Acquitted YES YES
Innocent Proper Convicted NO NO
Innocent Improper Acquitted YES NO
Innocent Improper Convicted NO YES
suits. Indeed, courts (and legislatures) do try to create judicial
processes that will yield accurate end results, and end results should
properly be considered in particular cases to determine whether a
given procedure is constitutionally offensive. Yet, process and end re-
sult remain two distinct concepts. The non-Raheem approach is incor-
rect because, by considering evidence that indicates solely whether
the police "have the right guy"2 34 rather than only that evidence which
bears on whether the witness's identification is well-grounded, the ap-
proach focuses on the accuracy of outcome (column 4) while ignor-
ing the adequacy of the process (column 2). The Raheem approach,
by focusing on whether the identification was well-grounded, 23 5 prop-
erly addresses concerns for both appropriateness of process (column
2) and accuracy of outcome (column 4), as Well as the separate con-
cern of the global appropriateness of outcomes.2 3 6
The Supreme Court has recognized this process/outcome dis-
tinction in analyzing a parallel issue under the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment (made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment) provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." 237 Since the beginning of its Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the Confronta-
tion Clause does not necessarily prohibit the admission of hearsay
234 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing cases employing non-Raheen
approach).
235 See supra Part III.D.
236 This concern is not represented in Table I, but is discussed in reference to
Brathwaite's third concern-the administration ofjustice. See infra Part IV.B.I.
237 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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statements against a criminal defendant. 23 8 The Court set forth in
Ohio v. Roberts that "a general approach" for determining the circum-
stances under which incriminating statements are admissible under
an evidentiary hearsay exception also meets the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.23 9 In the usual case, the Court noted, the pros-
ecution must either produce the declarant whose statement it wishes
to use against the defendant, or demonstrate his unavailability. 240 If
the prosecution satisfies this requirement, then the witness's "state-
ment is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability."24'
The Court went on to suggest that the prosecution could satisfy the
"indicia of reliability" requirement in either of two circumstances: if
the hearsay statement "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,"
or if it is supported by "a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 242
In Idaho v. Wright, the Court clarified what categories of evidence
courts may properly weigh in determining whether hearsay testimony
falls into the latter category. 243 Notably, the Court held that courts
may not rely on evidence corroborating the defendant's guilt-as op-
posed to evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing of the out-of-court statement-to support a finding that the
statement bears "particularized guarantee' t rustworthiness. ''244 The
Court opined that such evidence "more - opriately indicates that
any error in admitting the statement might be harmless rather than
that any basis exists for presuming the declarant to be trustworthy. ''245
The Court was particularly worried that the use of this type of evi-
dence to support the reliability of hearsay statements would permit
admission of presumptively unreliable statements "by bootstrapping
on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial. ' 2 4"
Therefore, with respect to admitting either hearsay or eyewitness
identifications stemming from an unnecessarily suggestive identifica-
tion procedure, the Court has developed a test of reliability to deter-
mine whether the Constitution has been violated. The Court labeled
reliability the "linchpin" of due process 24 7 around the same time it
determined that the "mission" of the Confrontation Clause was to pro-
23 8 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813 (1990).
239 See 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980).
240 See id. at 65.
241 Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
242 Id. The rationale for admitting hearsay testimony if it falls under a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception is that if such evidence were not trustworthy it would not fall under such
an exception. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1970).
243 See 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
244 See id. at 818-19.
245 Id. at 823 (footnote omitted).
246 Id.
247 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
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mote reliability. 248 As the Supreme Court did in Wright, the Second
Circuit in Raheem struck the proper balance for determining reliability
by refusing to consider corroborative evidence of general guilt.
Nevertheless, in less related areas, the Supreme Court has rarely
articulated and often overlooked the constitutionally and logically
sound thesis that procedural fairness reflects concerns for fair treat-
ment, not merely for correct outcomes.2 49 For example, in the well-
known case Strickland v. Washington, the Court applied an outcome-
determinative test in considering whether a defendant was denied the
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 2511 Even if
this test is tenable in the area of effective assistance of counsel, such a
test certainly should not be adopted in the area of eyewitness identifi-
cation because unlike the violation created by ineffective assistance of
counsel, where the government cannot prevent the occurrence of the
constitutional violation, the violation created when the government
employs an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure is the di-
rect result of government action. 25' The burden, therefore, should
remain on the prosecutors to prove reliability of the identification.
The non-Raheem approach absolves the prosecutor of this burden by
reasoning that, because the defendant is "the right guy," the identifi-
cation is probably reliable, and therefore its admission into evidence is
not a violation of due process.2 52 The Raheem approach, on the other
hand, properly demands that the prosecution affirmatively prove that
the identification testimony is not the product of an unnecessarily sug-
gestive identification procedure. Imagine using the non-Raheem rea-
soning in other constitutional areas where the prosecution is
responsible for the potential violation. For example, could the Court
248 Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985).
249 Laurence H. Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Struc-
tural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864, 871-72 (1979).
250 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-87 (1984). In formulating the con-
stitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland articulated a two-pro-
nged test: "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient....
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687 (emphasis added). In practice, the first
prong essentially collapses into the second, making this test completely outcome-determi-
native. In his dissent, Justice Marshall recognized this fact and argued that the prejudice
prong improperly treated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel as if its "only purpose ... is to reduce the chance that innocent persons will be
convicted." Id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's view, "the guarantee
also functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair
procedures." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
251 In this respect, the case for not considering evidence corroborating the defen-
dant's guilt is even stronger in the context of eyewitness identifications based on unneces-
sarily suggestive procedures than it is in the context of determining the reliability of
hearsay statements under the Confrontation Clause.
252 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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in good faith hold that if a defendant is probably guilty, then an other-
wise impermissible search does not in fact violate the Constitution?
Or that because the defendant is probably guilty, his coerced confes-
sion does not in fact violate the Constitution?
Further evidence that the non-Raheem circuits improperly con-
flate process and outcome is apparent from the role that the concept
of harmless-error plays in these circuits' analysis. The social function
of harmless-error analysis has been explained best by Chief Justice
Rehnquist:
The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces
jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to ex-
pend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that
has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their
disturbing experiences .... These societal costs of reversal and re-
trial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence when an
error in the first proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair de-
termination of the issue of guilt or innocence. But the balance of
interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no ef-
fect on the outcome of the trial. 253
The same social functions are served whether an outcome-deter-
minative analysis is used to define constitutional errors or is used
merely to determine their harmlessness. However, employing a
purely outcome-determinative analysis to define constitutional errors
improperly shifts to defendants the burden of proving the error's im-
pact on the outcome of the proceeding, distorts evidence, and usurps
the role of the jury.
The Supreme Court has divided constitutional errors into two
categories for purposes of harmless-error analysis, which differs de-
pending on the category of error. The first type of error is a "trial
error," or an "error which occurred during the presentation of the
case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in
the context of other evidence presented in order to determine
whether its admission was harmless. '"2 5 4 The second type of error is
"structural error"-"structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards. '"2 5 5
The errors in most cases, including those cases involving a pre-
trial identification procedure conducted in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights, fall into the first category. 25 " These errors usu-
25, United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986).
254 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991).
255 Id. at 309.
256 See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (holding that a witness's pretrial
identification of a suspect in the absence of the suspect's lawyer violates the suspect's Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel and remanding "for a determination of
whether the failure to exclude that evidence was harmless constitutional error").
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ally are subject to the Chapman rule, which acquires its name from the
Supreme Court's decision in Chapman v. California.2 5 7 In Chapman,
the Court held that if a constitutional error occurs, then the govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harm-
less-that is, that it "did not contribute to the verdict obtained. ' '2 58
This rule is based on the view that a criminal defendant is entitled "to
a fair trial, not a perfect one."259
The Supreme Court applied the Chapman rule in all federal
habeas corpus proceedings until 1995, when it held in Brecht v. Abra-
hamson that the less stringent harmless-error standard used by federal
courts to analyze nonconstutional trial errors also applies in determin-
ing whether habeas relief should be granted in cases of constitutional
trial errors.2 611 This standard, known as the Kotteakos standard,26' asks
whether an error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict."262
Regardless of which harmless-error standard courts apply in a
given case, the non-Raheem approach effectively collapses harmless-er-
ror analysis into the trial stage by declining to regard the deficient
process as unconstitutional in the first instance if it is apparent that
the witness identified "the right guy."263 Such an approach is imper-
missible because it fails to recognize that the process itself was uncon-
stitutional, but instead blindly considers that process to be
constitutional because it was harmless. Moreover, this approach
usurps the role of the jury because an appellate court that considers
the error harmless at the trial stage necessarily helps to determine the
weight the jury gives such evidence. Worse yet, doing so often leads to
distorted outcomes. For example, when the court in Raheem implicitly
employed this kind of harmless-error analysis at the trial stage, the
analysis became circular: the identification's suggestiveness was in ef-
fect harmless because the police "had the right guy," but part of the
reason the jury determined that the police did in fact have "the right
guy" was because of this identification. 264 When the Second Circuit
applied the proper standard, on the other hand, each piece of evi-
dence retained its independent value, and the court ultimately deter-
257 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
258 Id. at 24.
259 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
260 See 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993).
261 This standard is so-named because it comes from the Supreme Court case Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
262 Id. at 776.
263 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
264 This was certainly part of the reason that the jury found Raheem guilty as the State
had no evidence tying Raheem to the murder other than the identification evidence. See
Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 142 (2d. Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub non, Donnelly v.
Raheem, 534 U.S. 1118 (2002).
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mined that the trial court's admission of the identification was not
merely harmless error. 265
3. Accuracy of Outcomes
While the non-Raheem approach improperly focuses on outcome
to the exclusion of process, it does not necessarily yield more accurate
outcomes. Again, if courts were to consider evidence of general guilt
in determining whether an identification is reliable, that evidence
would essentially be counted twice-first toward general guilt, then
again toward admitting the identification, which would, in turn, act as
further evidence of guilt. This evidence would therefore be weighted
too heavily, to the point that outcomes could become distorted. In-
deed, this problem would be compounded by the fact that evidence of
general guilt would be used in part to support a proposition-that the
witness identified the defendant on the basis of information indepen-
dent of the tainted identification procedure-that is unrelated to this
evidence. Finally, the non-Raheem approach may impede progress to-
ward more accurate outcomes because it provides the police with little
incentive to improve their investigatory procedures.2 66 Nonetheless,
the corroborative evidence of general guilt does make it more proba-
ble that the individual identified by the witness is in fact the perpetra-
tor, or the "right guy," a fact that may or may not outweigh the
otherwise harmful effects that the non-Raheem approach has on
accuracy. 2" 7
Although corroborative evidence of general guilt points to the
fact that a particular defendant is "the right guy," defendants are usu-
ally "the right guy," regardless of such evidence.2 68 This proposition is
probably true because prosecutors may indict only those defendants
they actually believe are guilty and whose guilt the prosecutor believes
265 See id. at 142-43. It should be noted that Raheem's result is somewhat of an anom-
aly. Often, recognition of the process/outcome distinction discussed in this Note will not
determine whether a defendant is incarcerated. The more evidence corroborative of guilt
supporting an identification at trial, the more likely an appellate court will uphold a con-
viction under harmless-error analysis. That Raheein did not deem the due process violation
harmless was largely due to the fact that his confession was suppressed on a technicality.
See id. at 129.
266 See infra Part IV.C for a fuller discussion of the deterrent effects of the respective
approaches.
267 Indeed, the more evidence corroborative of guilt, the more likely that under the
Raheem approach a court would find admitting an unreliable identification harmless. See
supra note 265.
268 This assumption is quite difficult to verify, but has been made by many prominent
legal scholars, including Richard Posner. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the
Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1506 (1999). But several commentators do not
agree that this is a proper assumption. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaning-
Jul Convictions: Do We Really Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUIGERS L. REv. 1317, 1341 (1997).
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he can prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.269 Also, in addition
to the evidence that they will present at trial, prosecutors often possess
other corroborative evidence of a defendant's guilt that is inadmissi-
ble. 271 1 One commentator has stated this idea quite well: "If [uries]
return few erroneous convictions it is because they are given few op-
portunities to judge innocent defendants." 27'
Nevertheless, the accuracy of outcomes in individual cases can be
directly affected by evidence and procedures. Therefore, the unrelia-
ble aspects of the non-Raheem approach may lead to fewer accurate
outcomes even though this approach leads to more convictions and
most defendants are in fact guilty. Many guilty defendants who would
be convicted under the non-Raheem approach would also be convicted
under the Raheem approach, and more innocent defendants may be
convicted under the non-Raheem approach than would be convicted
under the Raheem approach. If the number of extra innocent defend-
ants who are convicted under the non-Raheem approach exceeds the
number of guilty defendants who are convicted under that approach
but who would escape conviction under the Raheem approach, the
Raheem approach actually will lead to more accurate outcomes. Re-
gardless, the criminal justice system does not concern itself solely with
accuracy of outcomes, but rather values erring on the side of protect-
ing the innocent in considering what process is due. 272 This Note re-
fers to this concern as the "global appropriateness of outcomes."
B. The Administration of Justice
This subpart explores how concern for the administration of jus-
tice reflects concern not only for accuracy of outcomes, but also for
the global appropriateness of outcomes, and further argues that the
non-Raheem approach may offend this notion. This subpart then ex-
amines how the individual procedural aspects of the non-Raheem ap-
269 It is possible that while most defendants are guilty, the plea bargaining process
eliminates so many more guilty than innocent defendants (due to the strength of the evi-
dence and/or the fact that innocents may want to go to trial because they believe in the
system) that at trial, the ratio of guilty to innocent defendants has reversed. See Erik Lill-
quist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 85, 101 (2002). However, as Lillquist recognizes, it is also plausible that guilty defend-
ants may be more likely to go to trial because they are less risk averse. See Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1943 (1992).
270 For example, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), character evidence is not
admissible for the purpose of "proving action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EviD.
404(a). However, it may be admissible for other purposes. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
271 Gross, supra note 6, at 432. The possible effect of a base number of actually guilty
defendants being higher than the base number of actually innocent defendants is dis-
cussed below in the section on the administration ofjustice. See infra Part |V.B.1.
272 See supra Part JV.B.
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proach may be procedurally offensive in ways apart from the concerns
mentioned thus far.
1. Global Appropriateness of Outcomes
In discussing the administration of justice, the Brathwaite Court
specifically stated that the per se approach would not adequately pro-
tect society's interest in preventing the guilty from going free. 27  The
non-Raheem approach certainly may prevent more guilty defendants
from going free by admitting more identifications. 274 Additionally,
inder the non-Raheem approach defendants will have one less proce-
dural aspect to appeal, which will probably lead to fewer overturned
convictions. Courts, however, have traditionally recognized the
strong, countervailing interest in preventing innocent defendants
from going to jail.2 75 Just as the per se approach is over-inclusive be-
cause it keeps evidence from the jury,27" employing the non-Raheem
approach may be under-inclusive because it may lead to the convic-
tion of an unacceptable number of innocent defendants. 2 77 In con-
trast, the Raheem approach concentrates on reliability, but it does not
do so at the expense of protecting innocent defendants because the
reliability factors that it permits courts to consider are directly related
to whether a witness has identified a defendant on the basis of infor-
mation perceived during the crime rather than during a suggestive
identification.278
In determining the acceptable ratio of convictions of innocent
defendants, the U.S. legal system does not look only to accuracy of
outcomes in the aggregate, but rather accepts the proposition that it is
better to let x number of guilty go free than to allow y number of
innocents to be jailed. Our system gives x a significantly higher value
273 See Manson v. Brathwaite,,432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977) ("The third factor is the effect on
the administration of justice. Here the Per se approach suffers serious drawbacks. Since it
denies the trier reliable evidence, it may result, on occasion, in the guilty going free.").
274 These identifications unquestionably are an important piece of evidence for the
prosecution. Without such evidence, the prosecution may have difficulty proving its case
even if the defendant is guilty. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
275 For example, most are familiar with Blackstone's maxim that it is better to let ten
guilty men go free than to put one innocent man in jail. See 4 WILtIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 352 (photo. reprint 1992) (1765).
27i See supra text accompanying notes 111, 116.
277 Many experts believe that mistaken identifications "present what is conceivably the
greatest single threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be pun-
ished." Carl McGowan, Constitutional Inteqpretation and C0iminal IdentiJicalion, 12 WmI. &
MARY L. REV. 235, 238 (1970). The negative effects on accuracy of outcomes previously
discussed are part of the reason innocents may be jailed under the non-Raheem approach.
See sulpra Part lV.A.3.
278 See supra text accompanying note 101 . At least in a general sense, the Biggers factors
are correlated to scientific evidence regarding affects on accuracy of eyewitness identifica-
tions. See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Idetification: Psychological Research and
Legal Polkcy on Lineup s, 1 PsycHiOL. Puri. Pot'N' & L. 765, 785 (1995).
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than y--this is the United States' common sense of justice.2 79 It is for
this reason, for example, that U.S. courts employ a "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" standard of proof in criminal trials; a "preponderance of
the evidence" standard of proof would yield a greater number of accu-
rate results, but also would lead to the conviction of more innocent
defendants. 280 Thus, courts should measure the global appropriate-
ness of a legal outcome differently from the accuracy of a given result
in a particular trial because global appropriateness specifically values
erring on the side of the innocent. As previously discussed, the non-
Raheem approach may offend this notion by permitting the conviction
of an unacceptable extra number of innocent defendants, even if it
helps to convict an even greater number of guilty defendants. 231 This
possibility is quite realistic because all of the outcome-distorting ef-
fects of the non-Raheem approach are potentially harmful to innocent
defendants.282 The non-Raheem approach is, therefore, potentially of-
fensive to the administration of justice because it may produce results
that are not correlated to accuracy of outcomes in a manner that errs
on the side of the innocent.
2. Appropriateness of Process
Protecting the integrity of the judicial system, not only for poten-
tially innocent defendants but also for guilty defendants, is one aspect
of the proper administration ofjustice.2 83 Indeed, it is for this reason
that fair procedure is guaranteed as an entity distinct from accurate
279 Society values x more than y becausejailing an innocent person offends traditional
notions of justice more than releasing a guilty person offends those same notions. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has noted that it is "a fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
280 See id. at 375. The Court noted that the reasonable doubt standard "is a prime
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error." Id. at 363. The
Court went on to stress that "doubt whether innocent men are being condemned" would
dilute "the moral force of the criminal law" and would impair the confidence of "every
individual going about his ordinary affairs . . . that his government cannot adjudge him
guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty." Id. at 364.
281 The word "may" is used in this sentence because one would need to derive a pre-
cise formula that values the acceptable number of convictions of innocents to determine
whether the non-Raheem approach is globally unacceptable. This formula would have to
consider how many more innocents are actually jailed under the non-Raheem approach.
Determining this number would be qtite difficult because society does not actually know
whether an innocent person was jailed unless that person is subsequently exonerated. Ad-
ditionally, one would have to assign normative values to probabilities ofjailing individuals
for particular crimes, which also would be quite a complex task. For a related discussion
on the complexities of such formulas, see Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1386-93 (1971).
282 See supra Part IV.A.2-3.
283 justice Marshall echoed this sentiment in his dissent in Strickland. See supra note
250. As noted by Justice Douglas, due process respects "the dignity even of the least wor-
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and globally appropriate outcomes. 28 4 Consequently, particular pro-
cedures themselves may be offensive wholly apart from the accuracy
and appropriateness of the outcomes that result from those proce-
dures.2 1  Regardless of whether innocent defendants are actually
jailed, the process afforded in non-Raheem circuits offends procedural
notions of justice by allowing a person to be convicted by a jury that
counts evidence of general guilt twice. 2 6 What is even more offensive
is the fact that the jury counts this evidence to support a proposi-
tion-the legitimacy of an identification-to which it is loosely corre-
lated at best.28 7 Perhaps the most offensive aspect of the non-Raheem
approach is that it encourages police to create suggestive environ-
ments. In his dissent in Brathwaite, Justice Marshall recognized this
concern, stating that the exclusion of suggestive identifications "both
protects the integrity of the truth-seeking function of the trial and dis-
courages police use of needlessly inaccurate and ineffective investiga-
tory methods."288
Raheem is a prime example of a case in which applying the non-
Raheem approach would offend the proper administration of justice.
Raheem was convicted of murder at the trial level based solely on an
identification resulting from an unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure (which was supported by only an inadmissible confession
perhaps motivated by the very suggestive identification it was used to
support), the confession and the simple fact that Raheem, like the
perpetrator, owned a black leather coat.2 89
C. Deterrence
This subpart concludes the analysis by considering in greater de-
tail the deterrent effects-Brathwaite's second concern-of both the
thy citizen." Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 207 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruded
on other grounds by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964).
284 The purely outcome-determinative approach shifts the focus from fairness to guilt
and could be logically extended to mean that a guilty person has no fundamental right to a
fair trial. Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 486
(1959). Additionally, employing a different approach to fairness depending on the
amount of evidence of general guilt would permit acceptable prosecutorial conduct to
fluctuate with the strength of the state's case.
285 However, as previously mentioned, these procedures should be correlated with the
concep(s of accuracy and appropriateness of outcomes. See supra Part IV.A.2-3. There-
fore, many offensive procedures overlap with those procedures that lead to distorted and
inappropriate outcomes.
286 See supra Part IV.A.3.
287 See supra Part IV.A.3.
288 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 127 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28'9 See supra Part III.A-C.
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Raheem and non-Raheem approaches. 291 In Brathwaile, the Supreme
Court recognized that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach does
serve as a deterrent to the use of unnecessarily suggestive identifica-
tion procedures, albeit to a lesser degree than the per se approach. 2-1 I
According to the Court, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach de-
ters police from conducting unnecessarily suggestive procedures "for
fear that their actions will lead to exclusion of identifications as unreli-
able." 292 This deterrent effect cannot be fully recognized, however,
unless courts employ the Raheem approach to corroborative evidence.
Under the non-Raheem approach, police will have less fear that an
identification will be found unreliable once corroborative evidence of
guilt is collected.29: This result is particularly troubling because those
police officers who already have evidence of a suspect's guilt are the
very people that courts should be most concerned about deterring.294
The fact that, as mentioned previously, few other safeguards exist to
protect suspects from such behavior further compounds this dan-
ger. 295 For example, the right to counsel applies only to lineups that
occur "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceed-
ings." 296 Moreover, even if Wade applies to a particular identification,
29o The deterrent effect of both approaches is a legitimate consideration because, as
already touched upon, deterrent effects factor into accuracy and appropriateness of out-
comes and appropriateness of process. See supra Parts IV.A.2-3, IV.B.2.
291 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.
292 Id. However, not all commentators agree:
[R]egardless of how specifically opinions define what is unnecessarily sug-
gestive, a police officer can never know whether he is violating a suspect's
constitutional rights when he is conducting an identification procedure.
That can be determined only when the indicia of reliability are examined.
These factors may not be known to the officer and certainly cannot be con-
trolled by him. The Court's approach leaves the officer without any firm
rules as to what conduct violates the Constitution. If the officer has no way
of knowing what actions are forbidden, he can hardly be deterred from
those actions.
Randolph N. Jonakait,. Reliable Identification: Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v.
Brathwaite?, 52 U. Coio. L. REv. 511, 515 n.15 (1981).
293 A court employing the non-Raheen approach is more likely to uphold the use of
identification testimony derived under such a procedure because any corroborative evi-
dence that the police produce to support the fact that the defendant is the perpetrator
could be used by the court to uphold the lineup regardless of the unnecessary suggestive-
ness of the procedure. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
294 For an example of inappropriate police conduct when the police already have
some evidence of a suspect's guilt, see generally KENNEDY, supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
295 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
296 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973) (holding that a defendant has no Wade-Gilbert right to have counsel present when a
witness is shown photographic arrays of the defendant, even if the defendant has already
been indicted); sup/ra Part II.A (discussing Wade, Gilbert, Kirby, and Ash).
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the defendant's lawyer is usually relegated to little more than an inac-
tive observer.29 7
In Raheem, had the defendant's confession occurred before the
lineup, what incentive would the police have had to conduct a non-
suggestive lineup? Wade did not apply to the identification because
formal, adversarial proceedings had not yet been initiated against
Raheem at the time the police placed him in the lineup.29 8 Under the
non-Raheem approach, the police would have been more likely to con-
duct a suggestive lineup because they would have known that a court
would consider this corroborative evidence of general guilt and that a
court, accordingly, would most likely admit the suggestive identifica-
tion on the basis of this evidence.
CONCIUSION
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split discussed in
this Note in favor of the Raheem approach. That is, courts should con-
sider corroborative evidence of general guilt that does not bear di-
rectly on an identification's reliability only in any post-trial harmless-
error analysis. First, Supreme Court precedent strongly supports the
proposition that courts should consider only Biggers-type factors,
which factors are directly related to whether a witness independently
identified a defendant, in determining the reliability of identification
testimony. Second, evaluating both approaches in light of Brathwaite's
three concerns-reliability of the evidence, the administration of jus-
tice, and deterrence-illustrates that the Raheem approach is prefera-
ble to the non-Raheem approach. Corroborative evidence of general
guilt may make it more likely that the defendant was the perpetrator,
but it does not make it more likely that the witness independently
identified the defendant. For this reason, considering this evidence in
determining the reliability of an identification impermissibly focuses
on outcome at the expense of process, which is both procedurally of-
fensive and, ironically, more likely to lead to inaccurate outcomes.
The non-Raheem approach also fails to consider the legitimate and
separate concern of the global appropriateness of outcomes.
In sum, the Raheem approach strikes a more acceptable balance,
permitting the admission of often-necessary identifications into evi-
dence, yet at the same time ensuring their reliability. If an identifica-
tion meets this threshold, a jury perhaps will be more able to
accurately weigh its probative value in light of its suggestiveness.
The result in Raheem underscores the importance of this circuit
split. The district court employing the non-Raheem approach found
297 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
298 See supra text accompanying note 162.
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Raheem guilty, but when the Second Circuit considered corroborative
evidence of general guilt only in its harmless-error analysis, it over-
turned Raheem's conviction. Hopefully, in resolving this conflict be-
tween circuits, the Supreme Court will better define its theoretical
approach to interpreting the Due Process Clause.
